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For all the talk of science being political, it is amazing how little research 
has been invested in the conceptualisation of “the political” within post-
positivist philosophy of science.  The latter gathered momentum in the 1960s 
with the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in which Thomas 
Kuhn pointed out that social factors such as scientists’ concerns and interests 
play a prominent role in the emergence of scientific theories.  In the aftermath 
of Kuhn, the emergent field of constructivist thought, now generally known 
under the banner of Science and Technology Studies (STS), has further 
concentrated on the social embeddedness of scientific practice.  Opening up 
the black box of scientific practice, STS has brought about what I call a “first-
order claim” that science is political.  Although this first-order claim comes 
in different flavors, its central gist is that actual scientific practice, because 
of its situated and human character, results in imperfect, value-laden and 
perspective-bound knowledge.1  In response to this widespread first-order 
claim, STS-scholars have repeatedly argued that the expert world of science 
should be brought into democracy if it is to serve as a legitimate basis for 
decision-making.  Democratization, in turn, has quite straightforwardly 
been conceived in terms of increased public engagement through reflexive 
communication and participatory approaches.  In the last two decades, this 
call for a democratization of expertise has gained increasing appeal with 
scientists and policy-makers involved in environmental decision-making. 
It has, for instance, led the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to extend its composition and include non-climate 
science experts and to communicate their findings in a more open and 
reflexive way, thereby showing awareness of the value-laden and uncertain 
nature of the results.  Although this democratization paradigm provides a 
corrective to the implicit privilege that the model of rational decision-making 
grants science, licensing non-expert involvement in the characterization of 
1I have elaborated this argument in-depth in my critique of post-normal science (Goeminne 
2011a, 631).
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current conditions and in the pursuit of “optimal” solutions, it—quite symp-
tomatically—reproduces the traditional logic which assumes that superior 
outcomes rest upon the quality of scientific facts informing them (Healy, 202). 
In this paper, I will start from the argument that such STS-inspired reforms 
fall short because they are predicated upon an inadequate understanding of 
the politics of science.  Within constructivist science studies, the concept of 
the political itself is all too often used as a black-box containing a variety of 
critical claims vis-à-vis science’s self-proclaimed values of universalism and 
rationalism, thereby giving way to dualistic ideas about either the politici-
zation of science or the scientization of politics as threatening democracy. 
It is therefore my conviction that STS needs to engage more explicitly with 
political thought if it is to open—simultaneously—the inextricable black 
boxes of science and politics.  This essay constitutes an attempt to bridge 
the worlds of constructivist and critical political thought.  In contrast with 
the widespread first-order claim that science is political, I will therefore 
elaborate on a second-order claim that turns the first-order argument upside 
down: science is necessarily political as it is the situated, human and—as I 
will argue more specifically—concerned character of scientific practice that 
makes scientific knowledge possible in the first place.  Rather than being a 
secondary, negative property that keeps science away from being perfect, its 
political character will therefore be understood as a primary, positive quality 
of scientific knowledge.  
When Matters of Fact Become  
Matters of Concern: A Compositionist  
Account of Climate Modeling
Over the past few decades, STS has taken down the unworldly image of 
science as a truth-speaking device and replaced it with a practice-inspired 
account of science as culture.  In arguing that matters of fact are always also 
matters of a particular concern, Bruno Latour has explicitly thematised this 
inherently human, that is to say, “concerned” character of scientific practice 
(2004, 225).  Seen within the context of its construction, he argues, scientific 
knowledge aims to fulfill a certain function, and the choice of that func-
tion depends on the scientist’s concern: What kind of knowledge is aimed 
at?  What is it supposed to account for and to take into account?  In other 
words, scientific facts are always already answers to a particular question, 
the latter expressing a particular way of being concerned with the world. 
Beyond construction and representation, I appeal to the notion of “composi-
tion” to convey the idea that a scientific fact is not chosen or given; rather, 
it is “concernfully” composed as a “matter of concern” in relation to what 
is considered to be the issue at stake.  As will be illustrated below with the 
case of climate modeling, the notion of composition nicely captures the idea 
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how—analogous to the creation of a piece of art—different elements are 
meticulously combined into a meaningful whole before the latter can be 
mobilized as a fact.2  So, in the “compositionist” account I am putting forward 
here, science does not represent a pre-existing reality out there nor does it 
construct facts out of the blue.  Rather, it reflects a very specific, concernful 
involvement with the world that allows it to come up with a meaningful 
composition.  
A closer look at the history of climate modeling makes clear that the 
notion of a global climate and the idea that it could be understood through 
the use of modeling techniques are indeed not separate ideas, but rather that 
they took shape simultaneously.3  Until the 1950s, climatology was pretty 
much a spatial issue focused on gathering local data such as temperature, 
precipitation, etc. and averaging them out in presumably stable geographi-
cal climate patterns.  From the 1960s on, however, this local, data-driven 
approach gradually evolved into a theory-driven, model-based and globally 
oriented discipline increasingly focused on forecasting the future.  As I will 
come to explain, this evolution was nurtured by the availability of increasing 
computing power combined with a military interest in weather modification 
as well as emerging environmental concerns with climate change.  
Initially, however, modeling techniques were used to introduce a certain 
degree of homogeneity in the vast array of disparate, local meteorological 
data.  Averaging local data over time as well as space is a prerequisite for 
obtaining relevant information about global weather patterns.  However, 
measurement standards as well as instruments and the way they are used 
may differ immensely over time and space.  How does one compare data that 
result from different recording methods?  And how does one deal with a mere 
lack of data, either in the spatial or in the temporal dimension?  According to 
Paul Edwards, this requires two complementary tasks: collecting planetary 
data in standard forms to build images of global weather and oceanic and 
atmospheric circulation (“making global data” [2010, 187-228]) and building 
complete, coherent and consistent global data sets from incomplete, inconsis-
tent and heterogeneous data sources (“making data global” [2010, 251-286]). 
Since the 1950s, modeling techniques have allowed climatologists to generate 
relatively homogeneous data sets, computer models serving as what Edwards 
calls “technical gateways” (2010, 11) between heterogeneous sources.  
2In a recent article entitled “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto,’” Latour argues 
that, after all the critique, deconstruction and debunking of postmodernism, it is now time to 
compose again.  Very similarly to how I try to elaborate the concept of composition and its corol-
lary notion of political objectivity (see further) in a way that conveys the idea of going beyond 
mere representation and construction, Latour argues that compositionism should “take up the 
task of searching for universality without believing that this universality is already there, wait-
ing to be unveiled and discovered.  It is thus as far from relativism as it is from universalism” 
(2010, 474).
3The brief account presented here is mainly based on A Vast Machine (2010), Paul Edwards’ 
illuminating monograph on the history of climate modeling.
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In a second step, the use of computer models to understand—rather than 
create—global weather patterns was boosted by an increasing social inter-
est in simulation and prediction, both from an environmental and from a 
military perspective.  Until the 1960s, basic modeling research was mainly 
supported by military sources interested in controlling and possibly modify-
ing weather patterns.  From the 1970s on, however, atmospheric scientists 
deliberately tapped into growing public concerns about human impacts on 
the environment to secure funding for their research.  As David Demeritt 
noted, both perspectives are consistent with what Edwards called the “closed 
world discourse” (1996) of Cold War America: “…a language of integrated 
systems, an image of global containment (of communism and environmen-
tal problems) and apocalypse, and a practice of technologically centralized 
management, communications, and command-and-control” (Demeritt 2001, 
315).  The basic idea, of course, is that simulation models enable so-called 
“virtual experiments” which allow manipulating variables at will and 
observing their effects and outcomes.  Indeed, in the case of climate change, 
the only way to demonstrate the anthropogenic character of climate change is 
to simulate what would have happened without humans adding greenhouse 
gasses (GHGs) to the atmosphere.  
From this rough historical sketch, one may already conclude that the 
current practice of climate modeling, and the image of a global climate it 
produces, is not the unique answer to an unequivocal question.  The prevail-
ing scientific construction of climate change should rather be viewed as a 
contingent social outcome of a dynamic interplay between problem framing 
and solution framing, this interplay being driven—but not determined—by 
particular, contextually bound concerns such as globalism, simulation and 
prediction.4
Actual climate models, the so-called General Circulation Models (GCM), 
simulate the behavior of the climate system by dividing the atmosphere into 
three-dimensional grid boxes (approximately 100 km2 in surface area and a 
few kilometers in height) and using supercomputers to solve mathematical 
equations representing the climate’s so-called core physics.  The latter mainly 
deals with energy transfer between different grid boxes and is based on fluid 
dynamics of the oceans and the atmosphere.  As models founded on such 
a 3D-grid intrinsically neglect all possible processes on smaller scales, the 
grid-scale of a climate model introduces a first aspect of a separation between 
internalities and externalities that, as will be argued, I see as an essential 
characteristic of scientific practice.  Whereas ‘grid-scale processes’ such as the 
energy transfer between grid elements are internal to the climate model in 
4I use the word “driven” here to discern my view from so-called “strong constructivism,” 
which holds that the social context unidirectionally determines the scientific content.  Indeed, 
particular concerns can only be identified retrospectively as they themselves are also outcomes 
of one and the same composition process.  The way, for instance, the notion of “global” is now 
commonly understood arguably owes a great deal to the current scientific understanding of 
climate change as a “global” issue.  
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the sense that they are modeled from the bottom up applying fluid dynam-
ics, sub-grid-scale processes such as cloud physics or the transfer of water 
vapor between water surfaces and the atmosphere are thus external to the 
dynamical core of climate modeling.5  However, sub-grid-scale processes are 
“internalized” by means of exogenously specified parameters that capture 
the large-scale effects of smaller-scale processes without effectively modeling 
them.  These parameters, such as the amount of cloud present within one grid 
box, are typically based on empirical data and further adjusted or—using 
climate science jargon—“tuned” in the course of the modeling process.6 This 
tuning process, however, does not turn the external sub-grid-scale processes 
into genuine internalities of the model.  As empirically parameterized entities, 
they are not internal to the model and thus not internal to the understanding 
of climate change such models provide.  
Another interesting separation between internalities and externalities 
happens on the level of GHG emission treatment within climate models.  It is 
only by excluding the messy social relations that drive GHG emissions and 
by focusing narrowly on their universal physical properties, Demeritt argues, 
that atmospheric scientists, concerned as they were about global homogeneity 
and predictability, have been able to capture the issue of climate change (2001, 
314).  Whereas “residence time,” “radiative signature” and “photochemical 
reactivity” are thus considered relevant properties of GHG emissions to 
climate modelers, the historical origins of these emissions are not, installing 
a mere indifference between, for instance, luxury and subsistence emissions. 
In illuminating the constitutive role played by particular concerns such as 
globalism, simulation and prediction in the historical emergence of climate 
modeling and the accompanying pattern of inclusions and exclusions, I have 
firmly adhered to my compositionist account of scientific practice introduced 
above.  Indeed, along the lines sketched here, I tend to argue that climate 
modeling composes climate change as a global-scale problem caused by the 
universal physical properties of GHGs: the prevailing image of what global 
climate change “is” and how we can “know” it was co-shaped through the 
modeling approach.
5It is important to note that the grid-scale is imposed by the available computing power.  In 
this case, indifferences with regard to externalities are thus not merely installed by the human, 
but rather by the human+technology.  In recent times, science has become more and more tech-
nologically mediated, so it is important to take this technological dimension into account, in par-
ticular its non-neutral role in co-shaping the resulting knowledge.  The way particular concerns 
play out is thus co-shaped by technology, in this case by computing power.  
6In this respect, it is interesting to note that climate models are also data-laden just as, vice 
versa, climate data are always also model-laden.
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Science is Political— 
Second-Order Claim:  
Indeterminism as the  
Foundationless Foundation  
of the Political
In elaborating on my compositionist account of climate modeling, I have 
been working towards a particular conception of the political character of 
science, which can now be summarized as follows.  Science, conceived as a 
concernful work of composition, is necessarily political as it entails a dialectic 
separation between what has been taken into account in the composition 
(internalities) and what has not (externalities).  I call this a second-order claim 
that science is political to distinguish it from the first-order version outlined 
above.  
Indeed, it should first of all be clear that a differing interpretation of the 
“situatedness of science,” i.e., the awareness that science is a human and 
therefore necessarily perspectival and value-laden endeavor, is at the heart of 
what differentiates my second-order claim from most first-order claims.  First-
order claims tend to—negatively—understand the situatedness of science as 
resulting in a restricted, suboptimal knowledge of the problem at stake, a 
knowledge that becomes the more “contaminated” by uncertainty and value-
ladenness, the more “situated” the issues get.  In highlighting the constitutive 
role of concern, however, my second-order claim positively understands the 
situated, perspectival character of science as being truly constitutive of the 
knowledge composed and as inevitably resulting in a division between what 
has been taken into account and what not.  The case of climate modeling 
affirms this: what it means to observe climate change is inextricably inter-
twined with the concerns of globalism, simulation and prediction that have 
guided climate modelers in their daily practice.  In a recent article, confirmed 
constructivist Brian Wynne clearly argues along this line when he says that 
“woven into the disciplined attempt to understand what nature is saying to 
us about changing climate processes are always ancillary but constitutive 
concerns and commitments” (2010, 291).  
A second major characteristic of my second-order claim is its ground-
ing in a dialectical relation between inclusion and exclusion: externalities are 
constitutive of internalities and vice versa.  As already argued, neglecting 
the political economy that drives GHG emissions enabled climate scientists 
to understand the effects of increasing GHG concentrations on the climate 
system.  “Such physically reductionist abstractions render the world analyti-
cally manageable,” says Demeritt, cautiously adding that “it is probably 
something that we cannot do without” (2001, 314).  A similar point can argu-
ably be made about the differentiation between grid-scale and sub-grid-scale 
processes.  Put quite bluntly, climate modeling would simply have been 
impossible without the introduction of a grid-scale and the associated pattern 
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of inclusions and exclusions.  It might be tempting to regard this separation 
between internalities and externalities as a deliberative process scientists 
perform in order to cope with the practical limits they are confronted with 
(time, computing power, …) in view of the infinite task of modeling “the 
world.”  But this would miss the point that it is precisely their concernful 
involvement with “the world” that allows climate scientists to compose a 
meaningful conception of what climate change is.  Indeed, such an account 
of externalities as negative side-effects of the imperfect character of actual 
scientific practice, would bring us back to the “first-order” claim that science 
is political because in practice it cannot live up to the idealistic view of the 
uninterested, unconcerned scientist who faithfully represents a reality that 
is independent of him.  In my view, however, the incompleteness of scien-
tific knowledge has to be regarded as a primary, constitutive characteristic: 
both the indifference towards sub-grid-scale processes and that towards the 
political economy of GHGs are to be understood as blind spots that act as 
a background against which the scientific image of global climate change 
stands out.7  
Thirdly and finally, it is important to see that my understanding of the 
political character of science does not necessarily entail a societal connota-
tion in the sense that exclusions would intrinsically constitute an issue for 
socio-political concern.  Although externalities such as the unequal political 
economy that produces GHGs may act as the germ of a political identifica-
tion, as illustrated by the so-called climate justice movement (see further), this 
does not have to be so as may be clear from the example of the “excluded” 
sub-grid-scale processes.  In stating that science is political, I thus merely 
claim that it differentiates between the internalities and externalities of its 
composition and that this differentiation process lies at the very heart of the 
scientific practice.8
This point reflects a similar distinction between “political” and “politics” 
made by the “radical democracy” theorists Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics.  For them, politics 
is an ontic notion referring to the manifold practices of conventional politics, 
while the political should be conceived on an ontological level as dealing with 
the very way in which society is instituted.  At the heart of the radical democ-
racy project stands a fundamental critique of the idea of the political holding 
sway over a great deal of contemporary democratic thinking, characterized 
as it is by rationalism and universalism.  Invoking the term ‘post-politics,’ 
Mouffe, amongst others, laments the evacuation of antagonistic notions such 
7To illustrate this view, one might think of the well-known figure-ground images such as 
the faces-vase drawing by Edgar Rubin.  Also here, the “external” ground image acts as a con-
stitutive background against which the “internal” figure image can stand out.  And also here, 
it is merely impossible to see both images at the same time or, in my compositionist terms, to 
internalize the ground image in a genuine figure-like way.
8Recently, I have elaborated this argument in the context of experimental nuclear physics 
(Goeminne 2011b, 12-18).
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as exclusion, adversary and contestation from the political sphere, because 
it reduces politics to a mere instrumental conception focused on the consen-
sual administration of environmental, social, economic or other domains 
(2001, 48-51).  In a recent article entitled “Apocalypse Forever?  Post-political 
Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change” (2010), Erik Swyngedouw 
has convincingly illustrated how international climate policy serves as a 
pre-eminent example of such a technocratic management approach, tellingly 
characterizing it as post-political populism: invoking the threat of a scientifi-
cally framed doomsday scenario, it paralyzes the struggle between differing 
and opposing socio-environmental visions, making everybody toe the line 
of neo-liberalism.  Contrary to such an instrumental conception, radical 
democracy theorists thus argue that the political should be conceived as an 
ontological dimension that determines our very human condition.  Indeed, 
according to Mouffe, human society is essentially political, first of all, because 
“the need for collective identifications will never disappear since it is consti-
tutive of the mode of existence of human beings” (2005, 28) and, secondly, as 
“in the field of collective identities, we are always dealing with the creation of 
a ‘we’ which can exist only by the demarcation of a ‘they’” (15).
In putting forward my second-order claim that science is political, I am 
thus expanding this non-essentialist thesis from the social to the natural 
sphere, arguing that the construction of objectivity more generally (identity, 
knowledge, …) is relational, its condition of existence being the affirmation of 
an exclusion.  Conceiving science as a concernful work of composition along 
the lines sketched above indeed shows how the condition of possibility of 
scientific objectivity necessarily involves exclusion, differentiating between 
what is taken into account and what is not.  In my compositionist account 
of climate modeling, I indeed focused on the constitutive role of concern 
in the contingent emergence of scientific objectivity, this being reflected in 
the inscription of inclusion/exclusion pairs in the final composition.  In this 
view, scientific objectivity has no ultimate foundation, neither in an external 
human-independent reality nor in an internal human-centered subjectivity. 
Rather, objectivity is relational in the sense that its construction, or rather its 
composition, necessarily entails the demarcation of what is excluded and thus 
not taken into account.  This absence of an ultimate foundation eventually 
serves as the very foundation of my political account of science; the latter’s 
political moment being situated at the point of deciding what to take into 
account.  I thus abstain from defining science or, more accurately, scientific 
objectivity, by politicizing it.  Understood this way, the scientific account of 
climate change is as universally objective as it is contingent: defining climate 
change, as illustrated above, implies the contingent installation of a—now 
politically understood—differentiation.
In this respect, it is illuminating to dig a little bit deeper into radi-
cal democracy’s theoretical framework.  Interestingly, Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that their approach is grounded in privileging the moment of politi-
cal articulation, or what they also call “hegemonic” articulation.  Drawing 
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on the deconstructionist notion of undecidability, hegemony is put forward 
by them as “a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable terrain” (2001, 
xi).  The very condition for a hegemonic relation to become possible, Laclau 
and Mouffe argue, is that a particular social force assumes the representation 
of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it.  Such a representa-
tion is then characterized by what they call a “political universality” in the 
sense that it depends on “internal frontiers within society” (xiii).  This view 
on hegemonic relations in the social sphere coincides with my earlier argu-
ment that the prevailing structuration of the natural order is founded in the 
irreducible political moment of deciding what to take into account and what 
not.  In this sense, my account of climate change knowledge as being as much 
universally objective as it is contingent could be interpreted along the lines 
of Laclau and Mouffe such that a scientific representation can now be viewed 
as possessing a similar kind of political universality or, more aptly, “political 
objectivity.”  Indeed, further resonating with my compositionist account of 
science, they write that, “In order to have hegemony, the requirement is that 
elements whose own nature does not predetermine them to enter into one 
type of arrangement rather than another, nevertheless coalesce, as a result of 
an external or articulating practice” (xii).
Climate Politics and the  
Post-political Illusion of  
Total Inclusion
Although explicitly dealing with the political, my analysis so far has not 
touched upon the politics of climate change, which—following Mouffe and 
Laclau’s distinction between politics and the political—should be understood 
in the sense of societal reform in response to the climate change problematique. 
In our Western techno-scientific culture, environmental issues in general and 
climate change in particular have predominantly been staged scientifically as 
an issue for politics.  Set up in 1988 as a mediating instance between science 
and policy, the IPCC has been mandated by the United Nations to make a 
policy relevant and internationally agreed-on interpretation of the available 
scientific knowledge on climate change (Agrawala 1998).  For almost 25 
years now, the IPCC has been framing the climate change issue as a scientific 
puzzle, in which the leading part is played by CO2 and its universal physical 
properties.  At this point of intersection between science and policy, an almost 
natural alliance has emerged between a scientific perspective that focuses on 
quantifiable entities on the one hand and a managerial, technocratic gover-
nance approach to politics on the other.  This has resulted in the issue of 
climate change, which is first and foremost a political issue questioning the 
organization of our society, being reduced to a one-sided CO2-abatement 
strategy.
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Interestingly, criticisms on the one-sided scientific framing of the climate 
issue as solidifying capitalist status-quo have come both from constructivist 
perspectives as well as from political theorists.  Leaving a political analy-
sis aside, STS-scholars such as Wynne and Demeritt on the one hand have 
focused on the role of science in failing to create “ownership” for the climate 
issue with ordinary human subjects.  “The intensely scientific primary fram-
ing of the issue, combined as this is with an intensely economistic imagina-
tion and framing of the appropriate responses,” Wynne writes, “may engen-
der profound alienation of ordinary human subjects around the globe from 
‘owning the issue’ and thus from taking responsibility for it” (2010, 291). 
Demeritt makes a similar point, stating that:
the narrowly scientific focus on global climate change addresses 
itself to an undifferentiated global “we” and relies exclusively on 
the authority of science to create this sense of global citizenship.  
In the absence of some other basis of appeal, “we” are likely to act 
more as spectators than participants in the shaping of our related 
but different futures.  (2001, 329) 
Swyngedouw, on the other hand, puts aside the specific role of science 
and understands this problematic in explicitly political terms, lament-
ing the depoliticization, or in his words post-politicization, of the climate 
change issue.  “The undisputed matters of fact (except by a small number 
of maverick scientists),” Swyngedouw argues, “are, without proper political 
intermediation, translated into matters of concern” (2010, 217).  This gives 
rise to an image of international climate policy as constituting a depoliticized 
landscape: no political subject is called upon and no political project is formu-
lated.  Rather than questioning the reigning socio-economic order by imag-
ining and formulating alternatives, a CO2-reduction strategy is organized 
within the existing neo-liberal order.  Disagreement is thereby confined to the 
ideological contours of neo-liberalism reducing political debate to a process 
of negotiation of (economic) interests centered on emission reductions, green 
technologies and market mechanisms.  Predicated on the alleged univer-
sality of science, Swyngedouw argues, “a consensual policy framework is 
established structured around the perceived inevitability of capitalism and 
a market economy as the basic organizational structure of the social and 
economic order, for which there is no alternative” (215).  Climate policy, in 
other words, has fallen prey to the post-political illusion that a totally inclu-
sive policy framework can be constructed on rational grounds.
With respect to this dual criticism on the scientization and depoliticiza-
tion of the climate change issue, the first-order claim of science being political 
has mainly resulted in a call for more reflexivity in communicating scientific 
knowledge to the public domain, thereby showing awareness of its value-
loaded character and its perspective-boundedness.  The latter point has for 
instance been raised in an opinion piece on the BBC News website by Mike 
Hulme and Jerome Ravetz, who argue that “we need a more concerted effort 
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to explain and engage the public in understanding the processes and prac-
tices of science and scientists.”  Whilst this may be a good thing in principle, it 
still leaves the framing of the climate change issue untouched as what Wynne 
calls “a problem of translation” from science to politics (2010, 290).  
Invoking my second-order claim that science is political, however, means 
that both the scientization argument (from STS) and the depoliticization 
perspective (from post-politics) now merge and it becomes clear that such 
a science-based consensual approach is bound to fail because it is precondi-
tioned on the alleged non-exclusive character of science.  However, as I have 
argued on the basis of my compositionist perspective, science does divide and 
separate.  In arguing that matters of fact are always also matters of concern, 
I have pointed towards the irreducible political moment that is situated at 
the point of determining what “the issue at stake” is, even so in science. 
Already in 1991, Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain argued that the attempt to 
create a carbon-trading scheme predicated upon the scientific universality of 
GHG emissions in effect erases the historical origins of the emissions, exclud-
ing the difference between luxury and subsistence emissions from further 
policy debate.  However neutral the invocation of “science” may seem, one 
can indeed not smooth out the non-neutral and very political practice that 
grounds the decision on what to be concerned about.
Lost in the translation from science to policy, the concernful work of 
composition that goes into the construction of a matter of fact is obscured 
in consensual decision making, which leaves policy nothing but externali-
ties to be managed in a technocratic way.  Understanding the task of raising 
and addressing matters of concern as a work of composition, however, is the 
true political heritage of constructivism, conceiving politics as a struggle for 
who and what is to be taken in to account.  Such a struggle, Swyngedouw 
argues, presupposes the openness towards “divergent, conflicting and alter-
native trajectories of future socio-environmental possibilities” (2010, 228), the 
composition of which constitutes the very political work that needs to be 
done.  A central feature of this approach to politics is the awareness that this 
work of composition is an unending task, as exclusion and antagonism are at 
the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility 
of its full realization.  In this sense, the theoretical potentiality for reform is 
always already embedded in the installation of a particular order.  Indeed, 
Mouffe also builds on the idea that exclusion represents the condition of 
possibility of inclusion (and vice versa) to argue for the very possibility of 
counter-hegemonic practices, that is to say “practices which … attempt to 
disarticulate the existing order so as to install another form of hegemony” 
(2005, 18).  Exclusions thus act as what Mouffe calls a “constitutive outside” 
around which a “collective identification” can arise striving for an alternative 
hegemonic order.  
This is convincingly illustrated by the way in which genuine concerns 
of local communities in developing countries, typically framed in terms 
of “environmental justice” or, more specifically, “climate justice” are 
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systematically repudiated in international debates on environmental issues 
such as climate change.  Rather than originating in a scientific context, their 
struggle for environmental justice is motivated by a day-to-day confrontation 
with the externalities of an energy and resource guzzling Western develop-
ment pattern including the clearance of rainforest land for the sake of animal 
fodder production or the environmental and social impacts of oil and uranium 
exploitation.  Along the lines sketched above, we can now characterize the 
environmental justice movement as being genuinely political, understanding 
it in terms of a collective identification around the constitutive outside of 
the neo-liberal economic paradigm.  Indeed, the truly interesting point about 
these externalities of the Western economic paradigm is that they have the 
potential to fundamentally question its neo-liberal foundations, provided the 
necessary political space is rendered available.  However, in a depoliticized 
landscape that is governed by technocratic consensual policy-making and 
where externalities are at best internalized in terms of market corrections, 
environmental justice’s political demand for these externalities to be taken 
into account as part of an alternative socio-environmental composition can 
only appear as radical opposition, so that it is sidelined.  In my view, this 
is also what happened at the UN climate summit in Cancun in December 
2010, where the blame was pinned on Bolivia for its fierce resistance against 
a weak agreement.  Along this line, I tend to argue that consensus-driven UN 
climate policy is running into its own limits.  It is indeed symptomatic of their 
incapacity to think of “the excluded,” that consensual approaches, notwith-
standing their emphasis on inclusion and participation, typically turn out to 
be exclusive in a dogmatic way: everybody is included as long as one plays 
to the consensual rules of the game.  
Conclusion: Climate Denial  
and the Return of the Political
Over the last decade, climate change denial and global warming skepti-
cism have taken the shape of a well-coordinated campaign with funding from 
industry and free market think thanks.  The so-called “climategate” affair 
that erupted in late November 2009 with the illegal release of thousands of 
emails and other documents from the University of East Anglia’s Climatic 
Research Unit may well be considered as the preliminary culmination of a 
decade or more of climate denial.  Various allegations were made that the 
emails showed climate scientists colluded to withhold scientific information 
and interfered with the peer-review process to prevent dissenting scientific 
papers from being published.  Climate scientists implicated in the controversy 
issued rebuttals and argued that the attacks on climate science were organized 
to sabotage the upcoming Copenhagen global climate summit in December 
2009.  Whether regarded as part of normal, critical scientific practice, or as a 
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crime against humanity belying the “inconvenient truth,” climate denial has 
indifferently been framed as a variant of a truth-challenging practice.  And 
while this may be correct when focusing on the motivations—ideological or 
other—behind climate denial, it does not tell the full story.  However true 
Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway’s characterization of climate skeptics in 
terms of Merchants of Doubt (2010) may be, such an account does not reflect 
on the basic principles of a science-policy architecture that is predicated upon 
a scientific framing of the problem at stake.  
This focus on the truth as being crucial to climate politics is easily under-
stood from the rational-decision making logic of translating science into 
policy: if only people can be convinced of the truthfulness of the “inconve-
nient truth,” if need be with apocalyptic images of a melting planet, they will 
be amenable to science-based climate policies.  This so-called public deficit 
model, in which public indifference is interpreted as a direct consequence 
of dis- or misinformation, is also implicitly present in most of the scholarly 
accounts of public perception of climate change risks.9  In problematizing 
the perception of climate change risk, such studies implicitly affirm the 
post-political idea that people can be mobilized politically if and only if they 
are correctly informed about the facts.  The use of the term “perception” is 
also telling of the secondary status that such studies attribute to the public’s 
capability to define risk.  In focusing on the different public perceptions, they 
suppose that there is one correct, factual definition of climate risk.  Wynne 
speaks of “the dominant scientistic cultural reification of risk as if it were an 
independently existing object …” (2005, 70).  This view of humans as rational 
agents that should be mobilized by hard facts rather than by their passions 
or interests is so deeply entrenched that climate denial is often perceived 
as a direct threat to successful climate politics.10  Reason enough for some 
to accuse climate skeptics of a crime against humanity, or to argue, as Vice-
Chair of the IPCC Jean-Pascal van Ypersele repeatedly did in the Belgian 
press, for setting up court cases against them.  What is thereby neglected is 
the possibility that public indifference or straight denial may have more to do 
with a non-adequate framing of the issue at stake.11  Interestingly, the wide-
9See, for example, Lorenzoni 2006 and references therein.
10The use of rhetoric devices and emotional appeal in convincing the public of the truthful-
ness of the facts, as happened for instance with Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth (2006) is not 
contradictory in this respect.  On the contrary, such—instrumental—use of rhetoric and emotion 
is in my view a symptomatic confirmation of the fundamental shortcoming of viewing humans 
as rational agents.  
11This does not mean that science should or could not play a role in framing a political 
issue.  Indeed, as I have argued in my account of climate modeling, climate change cannot be 
understood apart from apart from science.  Realizing that matters of fact are always also matters 
of concern and thus political on their own terms rather implies that when matters of fact do raise 
a matter of societal concern, they do so in a truly political, that is, divisive way, separating inter-
nalities from externalities.  This necessarily implies that the matter of concern raised in such a 
scientific way cannot be dealt with adequately through a consensual procedure that is predicated 
on that scientific basis.  This argument is also elaborated in my critique of post-normal science 
(Goeminne 2011a, 632-634)
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spread appeal of climate denial shows resemblances with that of right wing 
populism in Europe.  The idea of the human as a rational agent also featured 
centrally in the fight against the latter: if only people could be convinced 
of what right-wing populism was really after and of the untruthfulness of 
its arguments, if need be by mobilizing the image of Nazi Germany, voters 
would turn their back on it.  In Belgium, the populist, extreme right party 
Vlaams Blok was brought to the Court of Cassation, which found it to be in 
violation of the law against racism.12  In her analysis of the success of right-
wing populism in Europe, Mouffe draws a remarkable conclusion.  Rather 
than seeing it as a driving force undermining democracy, she diagnoses 
the increasing success of right-wing populist parties in several European 
countries as being a symptom of the stifling consensus at the center, which 
does not “allow voters to make a real choice between significantly different 
policies” (2005, 66).  In taking away the channels through which dissensus, 
disagreement and conflict can be expressed, Mouffe argues, the consensus 
at the center, whereby all classical parties have moved to the center under 
pressure of a global, neoliberal order, “is bound to give rise to the emergence 
of conflicts on the antagonistic mode” (5).  In other words, every attempt 
to depoliticize a societal issue, even when such an attempt is founded on a 
scientific basis, will eventually lead to a return of the political.  At this point, 
I thus suggest that the widespread appeal of climate denial constitutes such 
a symptomatic outburst of the political in a completely depoliticized land-
scape.  My argument is nicely summarized by paraphrasing Mouffe’s obser-
vation regarding the appeal of right-wing populism: in a context where the 
dominant discourse proclaims that there is no alternative to a global cap and 
trade emission scheme and that we should accept its dictates unless we are 
ready to take personal responsibility for the end of humanity, it is not surpris-
ing that a growing number of people are listening to those who proclaim that 
alternatives do exist, even if the latter carry a right-wing signature and are 
predicated upon a straight denial of sound scientific arguments (70) .  
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL AND GHENT UNIVERSITY13
12In response to this conviction, Vlaams Blok changed its name to Vlaams Belang and insti-
tuted a number of changes in its program.  Of interest with respect to my general argument is 
that this conviction did not affect the success of Vlaams Belang.  Only after a new right-wing party 
called the New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) came to the fore and presented itself explicitly as an alter-
native on the right did Vlaams Belang effectively lose a significant part of its voters.  
13 This work was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Research Foundation—
Flanders (FWO).  I thank the organizers of the workshop “New Climes: Critical Theory, En-
vironmentalism and Climate Change“ at the University of Exeter (Penryn, July 2011) where a 
preliminary version of this paper was presented.
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